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SYMPOSIUM 2004: COMBATTING CORRUPTION
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ROMANIAN
MENTALITATE:
A CASE STUDY OF CORRUPTION
Kandis Scott
In Romania, petty corruption – the bribes, the gifts, the cheating
that grease the wheels of daily life – presents a problem different from the
large-scale corruption discussed at this Conference.1 Ending low-level
corruption requires a change in community attitudes, which is not the
usual realm of legal rules or within the expressive or social norm function
of law. The pervasive low-level corruption in Romania reflects a cultural
bar to fighting large-scale cheating.
Influence of the European Union
As an applicant for accession to the European Union in 2007,2
Romania is now making legal and other changes to comply with
conditions for admission. One sticking point is the European Union anticorruption requirement, derived from the very general Copenhagen
criteria: “rule of law,” “a functioning market economy” and “the ability
to take on the obligations of membership.”3 Romania has adopted anti1

Transparency International, National Corruption Report 2003 at 13-14 (examples of
some large-scale Romanian government corruption), available at
http://www.transparency.org (last visited Sept. 21, 2004).
2
European Commission, EU-Romania Relations (2004) (Romania submitted its
application for accession June 22, 1995), at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/romania/index.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
3
The European Council adopted criteria for new members’ accession to the Union at a
1993 meeting in Copenhagen, Denmark. Candidate countries must achieve “stability of
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and
protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; and the
ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of
political, economic and monetary union.” European Commission, EU Enlargement – A
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corruption legislation, but according to the European Union Parliament, it
has not enforced those laws sufficiently.4
An example of this is recent Romanian legislation attempting to
assure the independence of judges from the executive power.5 This formal
approach to creating the rule of law fails to address a more critical
situation in the judiciary. Clients report that attorneys ask for money to
bribe judges. Attorneys say this is rare, but do not deny that the practice
exists. Judges, aware of the public’s complaint, insist that the lawyers
usually keep this money. If an attorney loses the case, the lawyer tells the
client that the other side gave a bigger bribe, so clients commit to paying
more next time.

Even if this conventional wisdom is false, that

Romanians believe bribery to be widespread supports a general cynicism
that impairs efforts to change the culture of corruption.

Judicial

independence is not enough.
Romanians agree with the European Union6 that their nation does
not fight corruption effectively. Although a majority of Romanians are
satisfied with the mass media’s efforts to combat corruption, the work of
the police, government, and courts was unacceptable to more than 24% of
the respondents.7

In fact, 17% of those surveyed believe that the

government had taken no measures against corruption.8 This cynicism
extends to the private sector also. For example, 50% of those surveyed

Historic Opportunity, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
These general statements, called the Copenhagen Criteria, are the basis for the more
specific requirements for accession.
4
European Parliament, 2003 Regular Report on Romania’s progress towards accession,
EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM (03)676 final OE) at 5-7/27, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/rr_ro_final.pdf.
5
See, e.g., Lege No. 653, Monitorul Oficial de Romania No. 905, Dec. 12, 2002,
available at http://www.monitoruloficial.ro/.
6
European Parliament, supra note 4, at 6-7/27.
7
Id. at 20.
8
Id. at 19.
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believe that wealthy Romanians achieved success by violating the law and
another 24% believe that personal relationships produced the wealth.
Only 8% believe rich Romanians acquired their wealth through hard work
or personal merit.9
behavior:

But these attitudes do not influence individual

the same Romanian ticket taker who criticizes high level

corruption, the nation’s failure to defeat it, and the lack of personal
integrity will admit a friend to a concert without a ticket.
Top-level corruption and petty cheating are related. According to
the Romanian Academic Society, corruption at the top makes it difficult to
argue that fighting petty bureaucratic corruption is a feasible or worthy
cause.10

While the European Union aims its efforts at top-level

government corruption-- the same behavior that troubles ordinary
Romanians-- it also wants to change low-level cheating. For example, the
European Union asks that an “anti-corruption culture develop in public
service” so that the entrenched culture of corruption does not continue to
hold the nation back.11 To satisfy the European Union, Romanians have to
replace their culture of cheating with different social norms.
Changing Culture
Romanians must change their mentalitate, the attitudes that the
Romanians themselves acknowledge and criticize in the abstract.
Romanians are so inured to petty deceit that they are unconscious of its
unethical character in specific instances. This begins in grade school.
9

Open Society Foundation, Public Opinion Barometer 17 (October 2003), at
http://www.osf.ro/en/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=18&Itemid=37 (last
updated Jan. 25, 2005).
10
Alina Mungiu Pippidi & Sorin Ionita, Romania’s Struggle for Better Governance, in
ROMANIA AND BULGARIA BETWEEN NATO AND EU 59 (Romanian Academic Society
ed., 2003), available at http://www.sar.org.ro/files_h/docs/events/brussels-final.pdf.
11
European Parliament Resolution on Romania's Application for Membership of the
European Union and the State of Negotiations, COM (2000) 710 - C5-0610/2000 1997/2172(COS), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/ep_resolutions/romania.htm.
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Students around the world cheat, but unlike most Americans, Romanian
pupils readily admit doing so. They blame their onerous workloads (7-12
courses in a semester all demanding much memorization) and their
parents’ insistence on high grades (a demand often enforced with a stick).
Students explain that because the teachers know about the cheating, it is
no problem. Their parents also are aware of their cheating but are more
interested in outstanding marks than personal integrity.
When I was teaching in Romania, I received a paper not in the
student’s handwriting.

The girl readily admitted that her father had

written it because she was busy. That is the kind of parent who would
bribe those who grade the college entrance exam. One high school student
provoked a “mini-scandal” when she received a 10 on that exam having
never received higher than a 7 during her school years. College students
bribe professors for grades and applicants make payoffs to get a job.
Corruption exists at all levels.12
Where does this mentalitate come from?

One explanation is

grounded in the fact that almost 30% of Romanians are poor.13 Their
seeing the lifestyles of other Europeans on television produces high but,
more often than not, frustrated aspirations.

The average reported

Romanian salary is about $132/month,14 the approximate wage of entry12

Andy Trincia, Corrupting Future Prosecutors: Law School for Dummies, PEACE
CORPS WRITERS (Nov. 2003), available at
http://www.peacecorpswriters.org/pages/2003/0311/prntvrs311/pv311pcvrom.html.
13
The World Bank found 28.9% of Romanians were poor in 2002. World Bank,
available at
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/0/C4CFB7B8C4D1658185256C240050A6A4?
OpenDocument (Sep. 2002).
14
The exact average monthly gross salary in 2000 was $132.61. This figure is derived by
dividing the average monthly salary in lei by the average exchange rate, as reported by
the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (NISES). In 2000, the former
was 2,876,645. NISES, available at http://www.roembus.org (last visited Jan. 24, 2005).
The latter was 21,692 per dollar. NISES, available at
http://tpb.traderom.ro/En/Cd/frame_gen.htm. There is a significant but unquantifiable
under the table economy, but even including that the nation is generally poor.
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level schoolteachers, who then give private lessons to supplement their
salaries. In fact, many successful educators teach school only for the
social security and medical benefits and to meet potential students for their
financially rewarding private classes. Even public bus ticket inspectors
supplement their salaries with bribes. A transit rider caught having failed
to punch his ticket should be fined but often openly negotiates a smaller
payment made directly to the inspector in the bus.
Secondly, an “underdeveloped bureaucracy,” not fully modernized
into an impartial, impersonal, fair institution, staffs Romania’s public
service.15 Functionaries do not understand professional ethics or see their
role as that of civil servants, rather than private fixers. One employee of
the Romanian Environmental Protection Agency prepared applications for
environmental permits as a part-time job. She saw no conflict of interest
because she did not personally review the applications she prepared--her
colleague at the next desk did so. The United States Social Security
Administration staff does not behave like this and not because employees
fear criminal prosecution. Fair dealing is a social norm in America and
bureaucrats are paid enough to conform to that norm.
A third explanation for the Romanian mentalitate arises from its
communist history. In the worst days of the Ceauşescu regime, there were
shortages of all consumer goods. One who worked in a butcher shop
would hold back a piece of meat for a friend who was saving her the last
bottle of yogurt in the milk store. As was true in many socialist states,
workers would repair their own homes with lumber taken from the
workplace. These are not stories of scandals, but rather of survival. Such

15

Pippidi & Ionita, supra note 10, at 58, available at
http://www.sar.org.ro/files_h/docs/events/brussels-final.pdf.
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communist-era strategies continue to influence modern Romanian
attitudes.
Status also plays a role in creating a culture of corruption.
Providing discriminatory public service is a norm where there is uneven
power status. A favor is granted to assert superior status, not as part of a
financial exchange. Seeking a favor acknowledges the higher status of the
other. These forces operated even under the communists because Party
membership accorded status when other forms of social stratification were
banned.16 In a nation with no middle-class, these power issues remain and
support petty corruption even where there is no economic gain.
I experienced this phenomenon personally because, being an
American in Romania, I had a status that inspired others to assert their yet
higher status. I was in Bucharest, an eight-hour train ride from home,
when the train workers went on strike and the few airplane seats were
immediately sold. While interviewing a lawyer at one of the big three
national labor unions, I described my predicament. The president of the
union intervened and assured me he would get me home. I expected a car
ride with union members going my way, but he found me a seat on a “sold
out” plane. He expected nothing but thanks from me. His influence is
called pila and those with high social status use it generously.
Russell Powell explains a variant of the relationship between status
and corruption. Power, often an attribute of status, is exercised over
underlings by generously permitting their corruption. Turning a blind eye
is more controlling than granting a favor because the higher-up can
withdraw the generosity at any time.

In this way, top-level officials

dishonestly exploit lower level officials’ practice of corruption to gain

16

Pippidi & Ionita, supra note 10, at 59, available at
http://www.sar.org.ro/files_h/docs/events/brussels-final.pdf.
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greater power.17 Such systems survive because they become the social
norm. Amir Licht observes that in High Power Distinction societies,
taking advantage of one’s power position is legitimate.

Low power

persons dislike being taken advantage of but accept it as a fact of life.18
“Most Romanians . . . loathe this activity, but alas, it’s the ‘system’ and
they are stuck with it. Pay to play or you’re not in the game.”19
The Ineffectiveness of Law
Trading gifts and money for public services and corrupt attitudes
arising out of poverty, communist history, or status relationships are not
readily susceptible to eradication through better implementation of laws as
demanded by the European Union
Communist governments punished corruption and expressed anticorruption values without affecting Romanian culture.20 In the accession
process, the European Union is trying for more: to socialize applicants to
European Union norms. It acknowledges the need to change attitudes in
order “to root out the high level of corruption in state and society.”21
Although states can adopt European Union standards formally, as
Romania has done by adopting new anti-corruption laws, the E.U. wants
17

Conversation with Russell Powell, Visiting Professor at Santa Clara University School
of Law, in Santa Clara, Cal. (Mar. 16, 2004).
18
AMIR N. LICHT, THE PERIOD OF SOCIAL NORMS: A NEW PERSPECTIVE 34 (2001).
19
Trincia, supra note 12.
20
See also, Dionysia Tamvaki, The Copenhagen Criteria And The Evolution Of Popular
Consent To European Union Norms: From Legality To Normative Justifiability In Poland
And The Czech Republic 22 (Paper prepared for the Workshop: “Implications of
Enlargement for the Rule of Law, Democracy and Constitutionalism in Post-Communist
Legal Orders” EUI, Florence, 28-29 November 2003), at
http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:39AtJrVtHQJ:www.iue.it/LAW/Events/WSWorkshopNov2003/Tamvaki_paper.pdf+Dionysi
a+Tamvaki&hl=en&client=firefox-a. (Nov. 2003).
21
European Parliament, Report On Romania’s Progress Towards Accession 6/27 (2004)
(emphasis added), available at
http://www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/delegations/roma/ROMA20040318/p5_a(2004)010
3_en.pdf. The European Union contemplates a top down battle against corruption:
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to habituate the public so that “European Union norms assume [a] ‘taken
for granted nature.’”

22

Despite these ambitious goals the European

Union’s efforts have been as unsuccessful as those of the Romanian
government.
Using laws or conditions of membership for their expressive
function23 fails because the meaning of law is a function of the social
norms, not government intentions.24 A norm exists only where there is a
consensus about how to behave that affects what people actually do.25
When citizens internalize a social norm they make it a moral commitment
with a psychological penalty for its violation.26 Romanians have no such
commitment to deter petty cheating. They understand that corruption by
high officials is wrong, but regard low-level corruption as necessary and
harmless. For example, a Romanian official assigned to combat bank
laundering acknowledged but brushed off the fact that a patient is
expected to bring a “gift” to a public health doctor. He saw no connection
between petty bribery and laundered bribe money.
Because those responsible for norm management are untrusted
Romanian politicians, the difficulty of inculcating personal anti-corruption
attitudes is greater.27

The expressive function of law can support

individuals who want to change social norms. For example when a public
transit system distributes “good conduct guides” asking cell phone users to
quiet their conversations, passengers are empowered to ask others to lower
their voices. But Romanians do not now seek to change their low-level
“[T]here must be the political will to eradicate corruption for only this will lead to
changes in attitude.” Id. at 7/27.
22
Tamvaki, supra note 20, at 14.
23
See Cass Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2051
(1996).
24
Id. at 2050.
25
Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 587 (1998).
26
Id. at 585.
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Given no Romanian norm against petty cheating, anti-

corruption laws reflect only the government’s edict, an edict originating
with the E.U., and do not influence behavior.
The future for honest Romanians does not lie in the European
Union’s conditions for membership. Hope is found in small indications
that social norms are changing. In 2003 fewer Romanians were asked for
and gave “gifts” in exchange for public services than in 2000.28 If true,
and even if untrue because those surveyed were ashamed to admit bribery,
these results show changing attitudes. Secondly, more than Poland and
The Czech Republic where European Union socialization failed,29
Romania has traditionally valued things Western and has seen itself as a
Western nation. It considers its mentalitate to be an artifact left by its
Eastern conquerors.

Just as this makes Romanians comfortable with

joining European Union, it may eventually open them to European Union
norms.
Although European Union conditions are not effective in swaying
individual Romanians’ attitudes towards corruption, the media may be
influential.30 Entertainment showing people resisting bribes as it now
shows them using condoms in love scenes, news reports of honest actions,

27

Sunstein, supra note 23, at 2049.
E.g., in 2004, bribes accompanied 32% of citizens’ encounters with medical services;
14%, with the legal system (5 year average) and 7%, with city hall; and 11%, with the
police. MetroMedia Transilvania, Barometrul de Opinie Publica 53, at
http://www.mmt.ro/Cercetari/bop%202004.pdf (Mai 2004). This is in contrast to 2000,
where bribes were tied to 55% of citizens’ encounters with medical services; 24%, with
the legal system, 12%, with city hall; and 20%, with the police. Open Society
Foundation, Public Opinion Barometer 16, at
http://www.mmt.ro/Cercetari/bop%202000.pdf (Mai 2004).
29
See Tamvaki, supra note 20, at 17-18, 20.
30
Michael McFaul, an expert on Russia, in referring to large-scale government
corruption, contends that only an effective opposition party and a free press can stop
corruption. E-mail from Michael McFaul, Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow, Hoover
Institution, Stanford University, to Kandis Scott, Professor of Law, Santa Clara
University School of Law (Aug. 8, 2004) (on file with author).
28
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and public service advertisements can be more effective than law in
reaching low level corruption. Since our Conference, the European Union
has moved in this direction. It funded a media campaign launched by
Transparency International to fight corruption in Romania. The slogan is
simple: “don’t bribe.” The effort includes a television program, web
page, leaflets, and stage shows in thirteen towns. A short television ad
characterizes bureaucrats’ bribe taking as burglary.31

This is a clear

attempt to change the public’s benign attitude towards corruption to one of
hostility, like that towards theft.
It is difficult for those committed to advancing the rule of law to
acknowledge the inadequacy of law.

Nonetheless humility demands

recognition that the power of social norms has overwhelmed legal attacks
on petty corruption in Romania and other countries. Alternatives aimed
directly at underlying social attitudes have a greater likelihood of success.

31

See Mihaela Gherghisan, Anti-corruption campaign launched in Romania,
EUOBSERVER.COM, at http://euobserver.com/?sid=17&aid=17063 (Aug. 9, 2004).
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